Coulson: On Synthesis of Institutional Diagnostic

The big question is whether the country should have an industrial strategy which goes beyond creation of basic infrastructure, or whether it just leaves this to market forces. Justin Lin argues for a version of the Korean (or Ethiopian) strategy, finding tradeable products where the costs of production are a little below that of the main existing producers, and investing in those areas to supply world markets (with domestic markets only supplied incidentally – i.e. not the present strategy which is basically the colonial strategy of import substitution plus processing of agricultural or other products to increase the value added before export).
Murufuki et al.’s book point out that the governments in the Asian tigers played a key role in creating strategies and ensuring they were implemented. Tanzania briefly tried to emulate Malaysia, with Big Results Now (BRN), but Vietnam, with its period of socialist industrialisation is a better model. So far, I have seen little recognition that Tanzania can be competitive in some world markets (and has to be so if these are to be part of its growth engine) and has the single-minded determination to achieve that shown by the Asian tigers. Mufuruki understands this, which is why his book so interesting.

The well-written section on corruption reinforces points made in Chapter 1 and elsewhere.
The point on p.6 about the need for much stronger regulatory bodies is very correct. But to work they need a functioning legal system, and skilled and experienced staff who can collect evidence and present it in court successfully when faced with extremely hostile and highly-paid barristers. It also requires a willingness to face local vested interests i.e. those who have no wish to be regulated. The failure of the attempts to maintain cotton production in the Lake areas by introducing contract farming is a good case in point: the efforts of the regulator (the Cotton Board) were sabotaged by small private ginners who were prepared to buy and sell low quality adulterated cotton.
Chambi Chachage’s thesis has much to say on the slow emergence of an African business class, and, overall, its preference for making money from trade or the media to traditional manufacturing.
The points about centralisation bias and the distrust of market mechanisms and the private sector are extremely well taken. There needs to be a willingness to let go, to trust other people provided institutional systems are in place that will deal with irregularities or crimes when these are identified. The private sector itself will have to take more centre stage than it has been allowed to, at any time in Tanganyika or Tanzania’s history. That is why Mufuruki’s and Chambi’s works are so significant.